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likely be correct. The distinction could lie in the quality of the
materials, the expertise of the maker, or the overall nature of
the fabricator's business. In such an area of the law, dogmatic
classifications and mechanical tests should be avoided.
The two traditional tests of our law, principal value and
intent of the parties, provide a sound vehicle for proper determination of the nature of the contract. Through their interplay,
they can provide a reliable determination of the essence of the
contract. It is to be hoped that courts passing on similar questions in the future will more carefully develop and elaborate the
peculiar facts of the case. It is even conceivable that the present
case could be justified by a more complete factual determination.
As reported, however, Kegler's, Inc. v. Levy only confuses an
already uncertain area of our law.
John Franklin Weeks
LOUISIANA'S STATUTORY WILL:

THE ROLE OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
The attestation clause of the contested statutory will' was
1966." Finding no general principle at either
dated "October-,
civil or common law which required that testaments be dated,
the supreme court reasoned that unless specifically required by
statute the date of execution need not be included in the instrument. The court held,2 that the testament was a valid statutory
will because, when a statutory will is incompletely dated, the
date of execution may be established by ordinary proof. Succession of Gordon, 257 La. 1086, 245 So.2d 319 (1971).
By creating the statutory will,8 the legislature established
1. Provided for under the terms of LA. R.S. 9:2442-2443 (Supp. 1964),
commonly referred to as the Louisiana Wills Statute.

2. Justice Barham authored the majority opinion with one justice concurring, two justices concurring in the decree, one justice dissenting, and
one justice recused.
3. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964): "In addition to the methods provided in
the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be valid if in writing (whether typewritten, printed, mimeographed, or written in any other manner), and signed
by the testator in the presence of a notary public and two witnesses in the
following manner:
"(1) In the presence of the notary and both witnesses the testator shall
signify to them that the instrument is his will and shall sign his name on
each separate sheet of the instrument. If, however, the testator declares
that he is not able to sign his name because of some physical infirmity,
express mention of his declaration and of the cause that hinders him from
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a form of testament similar to the statutory will which exists
in varying forms in all of the common law states. 4 The statutory
will, while less technical than the testamentary forms provided
by the Civil Code, has adequate safeguards against fraud, deception, undue influence, and imposition. 5 Since it may be drawn
up by the notary out of the presence of the testator,O this form
of testament readily lends itself to the recital of lengthy dispositions, and to use by persons who are hospitalized. Secrecy of
the dispositions may be preserved because it is not necessary
that the will be read aloud in its entirety when executed. 7 The
relatively few formal requirements prevent misuse, and facilitate
the use of the statutory will as a testament adaptable to all
purposes.
The courts, in keeping with this legislative intent, have generally been liberal in their construction and application of the
statute.8 This liberal attitude is illustrated by three general principles of construction that the courts have applied to statutory
wills. First, in order to implement the wishes of the testator, the
validity of a testament is maintained if at all possible.9 Second,
a statutory will is valid so long as it is in "substantial compliance" with the formal requirements set out in the statute. 10
Third, the courts refuse to impose requirements for validity not
signing his name must be made In the act, and he shall then affix his mark
on each separate sheet of the instrument.

"(2) The notary and both witnesses must sign their names at the end of
the will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other.
"(3) The foregoing facts shall be evidenced In writing above the signatures of the notary public and witnesses and the testator at the end of the
will. Such declaration may be in the following form or a form substantially
similar thereto: 'Signed on each page (or If not signed by the testator, the

statement of his declaration that he is not able to sign his name and of the

physical cause that hinders him from signing) and declared by testator above

named, in our presence to be his last will and testament, and in the presence
of the testator and each other we have hereunto subscribed our names on
this

day of

-,

19

'"

4. Comment, 28 TUL. L. REv. 288 (1954), and authorities cited therein.
5. Oppenheim, The Testate Succession, 36 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1961); Com-

ment, 28 TUL. L. REV. 288 (1954); Note, 20 LA. L. REv. 610 (1960); Note,
9 LOYOLA L. REV. 128 (1958).

6. Succession of Chopin, 214 So.2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Succession
of Guidry, 160 So.2d 759 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).

7. Succession of Barrieu, 148 So.2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused,
244 La. 203, 151 So.2d 493 (1963).

8. The supreme court commented on this liberal construction of the
statute in Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So.2d 551 (1971).

9. Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So.2d 551 (1971); Succession of
Thibodeaux, 238 La. 791, 116 So.2d 525 (1959).
10. Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So.2d 551 (1971).
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expressly provided in the statute.1 1 While not susceptible of
precise definition, these principles nevertheless offer some guidelines to the reasoning of the courts.
The statute establishes two general requirements for the
12
validity of a statutory will. First, the will must be written.
Any form of writing will suffice. This requirement is consistent
with Louisiana's general policy of refusing to recognize oral testamentary dispositions. 13 Second, all parties to the execution of
a statutory will (the testator, notary, and attesting witnesses)
must be literate. 1 4 In its original form the statute required only
that the parties be able to read. Reacting to what was perhaps
an overly liberal interpretation of this requirement by the
courts,' 5 the legislature amended the statute in 1964 to require
that the testator know how to sign his name, and that the witnesses know how to and physically be able to sign their names.1
In addition to these two basic requirements, Louisiana courts
have interpreted the statute to require five other elements essential to the validity of a statutory will:
1. The testator, notary, and witnesses must sign in the presence of each other. In the first case' 7 to reach the Louisiana Supreme Court concerning a statutory will, it was
held that failure to comply with this provision is fatal
to validity.
2. The testator must signify to the notary and witnesses
that the instrument is his will.18 This signification need
not be verbal, and apparently any act that conveys the
intent of the testator will suffice as a non-verbal signification.' 9
11. Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Succession of Suarez, 219 So.2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Succession of Guidry,
160 So.2d 759 (La. App. 3d Or. 1964); Succession of Barrieu, 148 So.2d 836
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 203, 151 So.2d 493 (1963).

12. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964).
13. LA. CIV. CODs art. 1576.
14. LA. R.S. 9:2442-2443 (Supp. 1964).
15. Succession of Anderson, 159 So.2d 776 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (will of
testator who did not know how to write held valid); Succession of Butler,
152 So.2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 688, 153 So.2d 882
(1963) (same).
16. La. Acts 1964, No. 123, § 1.
17. Succession of Pope, 230 La. 1049, 89 So.2d 894 (1956).
18. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964); Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242
So.2d 551 (1971); Howard v. Gunter, 215 So.2d 222 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
19. Succession of Chopin, 214 So.2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Succession of Guidry, 160 So.2d 759 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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3. The testator must sign each separate sheet of the instrument.20 The testator's mark in place of his signature is
acceptable only if the testator knows how to sign his
name, but some physical infirmity prevents him from
doing so. 21 If such is the case, the testator must declare
that he is unable to sign, and the document must contain
express mention of the testator's declaration and the
cause which prevents him from signing.22 Assistance
given to the testator to enable him to sign will not render a statutory will invalid unless there is some evidence
of force or coercion. 23 The 1964 amendment requiring that
express mention be made of a physical infirmity does not
apply when assistance is given to the testator in signing
name in
unless the testator is totally unable to sign his
24
any manner and is forced to make his mark.
4. There must be an attestation clause.25 The attestation
clause serves as a "certificate which certifies the facts
26
and circumstances attending execution" of the will.
Although Succession of Gordon presents a question as
to which facts and circumstances must be included in
the attestation clause, there is no doubt that there must
be an attestation clause and that the clause must be substantially similar to the suggested form set out in the
statuteY.
5. The testator,notary, and witnesses must sign at the end
20. Land v. Succession of Newsom, 193 So.2d 411 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
21. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964); Succession of Chopin, 214 So.2d 248 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968).
22. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964).
23. Succession of Guidry, 160 So.2d 759 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Succession of Anderson, 159 So.2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Succession of Barrieu, 148 So.2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 203, 151 So.2d
493 (1963).
24. Succession of Broussard, 210 So.2d 589 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 252 La. 837, 844, 214 So.2d 161, 164 (1968).
25. Howard v. Gunter, 215 So.2d 222 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Succession
of Michie, 183 So.2d 436 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 249 La. 118, 185
So.2d 529 (1966).
26. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 773, 98 So.2d 181, 184 (1957); Succession of Reeves, 224 So.2d 502, 504 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 254 La.
812, 227 So.2d 146 (1969); Succession of Wilson, 213 So.2d 776, 779 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ refused, 253 La. 56, 216 So.2d 305 (1968).
27. Howard v. Gunter, 215 So.2d 222 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Succession
of Michie, 183 So.2d 436 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writs refused, 249 La. 118, 185
So.2d 529 (1966).
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of the will below the attestation clause.2

The statute

could be construed to require the signature of the testator both at the end of the dispositive provisions of the
will and again at the end of the attestation clause. However, this contention was rejected in Succession of Nourse.
The end of the will is that part which follows the testamentary dispositions, 29 so that the statutory requirements
are met if the will is arranged so that the dispositions are
followed by the attestation clause, which is followed by
all the signatures. The statute implies that the testator
must sign first, but there is no requirement that his signature appear above the others. 0
Although the meanings of some of the terms used in the
statute are not clear, the jurisprudence has resolved most of
these ambiguities.8 1 The only requirement for validity that has
escaped precise definition is the requirement that the attestation
clause be "substantially similar" to the form of the statutory
model. In Gordon the supreme court applied the standard of
"substantial compliance" and found that the complete date was
not a necessary element of the attestation clause. In order to
determine whether the attestation clause of a statutory will is
in "a form substantially similiar" to the suggested statutory
model, it is necessary to identify the essential elements of the
28. Succession of Nourse, 234 La. 691, 101 So.2d 204 (1958); Succession
of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957); Succession of Wilson, 213 So.2d 776
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 253 La. 56, 216 So.2d 305 (1968); Succession
of Broussard, 210 So.2d 589 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 252 La. 837, 844,
So.2d 529 (1966).

29. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957); Succession of
Peterson, 240 So.2d 39 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 257 La. 175, 241 So.2d
532 (1970); Succession of Chopin, 214 So.2d 248 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
30. Succession of Reeves, 224 So.2d 502 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused,
254 La. 812, 227 So.2d 146 (1969); Succession of Suarez, 219 So.2d 1 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969).
31. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957) ("end of the will");

Land v. Succession of Newsom, 193 So.2d 411 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 250 La. 262, 195 So.2d 145 (1968) ("separate sheet"); Succession of
Guidry, 160 So.2d 759 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) ("signify"); Succession of
Butler, 152 So.2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 668, 153 So.2d

882 (1963)

("signed").

Apart from statutory interpretation, the validity of

many wills turns on the answers

to questions

of fact

which determine

whether the formal requirements have been met. See, e.g., Succession of
Thibodeaux, 238 La. 791, 116 So.2d 525 (1959) (whether testatrix was literate); Succession of Pope, 230 La. 1049, 89 So.2d 894 (1956) (whether parties

signed in the presence of each other); Succession of Chopin, 214 So.2d 248
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) (whether testatrix declared that she was unable to
sign); Succession of Guidry, 160 So.2d 759 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (whether
testatrix signified that the instrument was her will).
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attestation clause. Obviously, only the omission of an essential
element would be fatal to validity.
In examining the literal language of the statute, it should
first be noted that R.S. 9:2442 is divided into three numbered
paragraphs.8 2 The first two paragraphs set forth the procedure
to be followed during the actual execution of the will, while the
third paragraph requires that the will have an attestation clause,
and it provides a suggested form for that clause.
R.S. 9:2442 (1) and (2) contain three elements essential to
the execution of a valid statutory will, each of which also appears in the suggested form of the attestation clause. These three
elements are: (1) a declaration that the testator declared to the
notary and witnesses that the instrument was his will, (2) a
declaration that the instrument was signed by the testator on
each sheet, and (3) a declaration that the parties signed in the
presence of each other.
R.S. 9:2442(3) requires that the "foregoing facts" be evidenced in the attestation clause. The "foregoing facts" are the
three above-mentioned elements which appear in R.S. 9:2442(1)
and (2). The use of the word shall makes the inclusion of these
facts mandatory. 83 The declaration required by R.S. 9:2442 (3)
may be in the suggested form or in "a form substantially similar
thereto."8 4 The form suggested by the statute includes the three
elements mentioned in R.S. 9:2442 (1) and (2), and then adds a
fourth element-the date. The date of execution is not mentioned in R.S. 9:2442 (1) and (2), and thus it is not a "foregoing
fact." Since the statute provides only that "foregoing facts"
shall be evidenced in the declaration, the date may be included,
but by the literal terms of the statute the date is not mandatory.85
Although there may be considerable debate over the meaning of the term "substantially similar," no express legislative
32. For complete text of LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964), see note 3 supra.
33. LA. R.S. 1:3 (1950) provides: "The word 'shall' is mandatory .. .
34. Id.: "[T]he word 'may' is permissive."
35. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1968 Term-

Successions and Donations, 24 LA. L. REv. 184, 186 (1964): "Words are generally understood in their most usual signification, and it Is a cardinal rule
of statutory construction that legislative intent must primarily be ascertained
from the language used and not from conjecture aliunde, and that it is only
where the statute is of doubtful meaning that resort can be had to elements
beyond the words of the statute."
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mandate that the attestation clause be dated can be found within
the vague outlines of this term. Had the legislature intended
that the date be an essential element of the attestation clause
it could have accomplished this purpose by either mentioning
the date in R.S. 9:2442(1) and (2), thus making it a "foregoing
fact," or by requiring that the suggested attestation form be
mandatory. This was not done and as a result the statute does
not require, by its terms, a date.8 6
While the language of the statute may indicate that the first
three elements of the suggested form of the attestation clause
are mandaory for validity of the will, Louisiana courts have
held only two of these elements to be essential. First, the attestation clause must contain a declaration that the parties have
signed in the presence of each other.81 Second, there must also
be a declaration in the attestation clause evidencing that the
testator signified to the notary and the witnesses that the instrument is his will.88
Although a literal interpretation of the statute makes it apparent that a declaration that the will has been signed on each
separate sheet is essential to the attestation clause, the court in
Succession of Babin89 held that it was not necessary that the
attestation clause contain such a declaration if in fact the testator has signed each separate sheet. According to the Babin
decision, "[t]he Courts are more inclined to find substantial
compliance when the mischief against which the statute was
enacted is not present. ' 40 If it is proper, as was done in Babin,
36. Contra, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 19691970 Term-Successions and Donations, 31 LA.. L. Rzv. 223, 231 (1971).
37. Howard v. Gunter, 215 So.2d 222 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
38. Id.; Succession of Pickett, 189 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966);
Succession of Saarela, 151 So.2d 144 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); Succession of
Barrieu, 148 So.2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 203, 151 So.2d
493 (1963). In Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So.2d 551 (1971), the
attestation clause did not contain a specific statement that the testatrix had
declared the instrument to be her will. In keeping with its traditionally
liberal construction of the statute, the supreme court held that the attestation
clause need only "reflect" that such declaration was made.
39. 215 So.2d 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 654. In Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957),
which was the second case decided concerning the Louisiana statutory will
and the first case to uphold the validity of a statutory will, the supreme
court cited a New York case, In re Mackris' Estate, 68 Misc. 46, 124 N.Y.S.2d
891 (1953), in support of the principle that "courts are more inclined to find
substantial compliance when the mischief against which the statute was
enacted is not present." This standard became more firmly established
when the supreme court cited Mackris' Estate a second time in Succession
of Nourse, 234 La. 691, 101 So.2d 525 (1958). Since that time the standard of
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to refuse to require that elements which, according to the statute, are clearly essential to a valid attestation clause be included
in the testament, a fortiori, elements which are not clearly required by the statute need not be included in the attestation
clause. This position was taken in Succession of Suarez;41 there
the court determined that only those requirements preceding
subparagraph (3) of the statute must be evidenced by the attestation clause, and went on to state that "[the courts] cannot
impose any additional formal requirement. '42 In Gordon the
court affirmed Suarez by holding that, as a nonessential element
of the attestation clause of a statutory will, the date of execution is not required in order for the testament to be valid.4
Extensive research has revealed no Louisiana decision prior to
Gordon which even implies that the date of execution is an es44
sential element of the attestation clause.
Although neither the statute nor the jurisprudence make
the date a formal requirement for validity of a statutory will,
it is still necessary to determine whether some general principle at either common or civil law necessitates inclusion of
the date of execution in order for a testament to be valid. The
Louisiana Wills Statute had as its origin similar statutes existing
in all of the common law states.45 It is well settled at common
law that, in the absence of an express statutory requirement,
the date of execution is not essential to the validity of a statu46
tory will.

The Louisiana Civil Code provides four types of testaments:
nuncupative by public act, 47 nuncupative under private signature,4 8 mystic, 49 and olographic.' In order to be valid under the

Civil Code, a will must meet the requirements of one of these
substantial compliance and the holding of In

re Mackris' Estate have been

permanently ingrated into the Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the
statutory will. Numerous other decisions such as Succession of Babin, 215
So.2d 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), which also cited In re Mackr& Estate,
have been based upon this principle first adopted in Succession of Eck.
41. 219 So.2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).

42. Id. at 2.
43. Accord, Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
44. For a source indicating that a date would be essential to validity of
a statutory will in Louisiana, see Comment, 28 TUL. L. REv. 288, 295 (1954).
45. Comment, 28 TUL. L. REv. 288 (1954), and authorities cited therein.
46. Id. at 295.
47. LA. CIv. CODE: arts. 1578-80.
48. Id. arts. 1581-83.
49. Id. arts. 1584-87.
50. Id. arts. 1588-89.
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four forms.51 Of the forms provided in the Code, only the olo52
graphic expressly requires a date.

The French Civil Code, which contains no counterpart to
Louisiana's nuncupative will under private signature, establishes
only three forms of wills: nuncupative by public act, mystic,
and olographic; only the olographic will must be dated. However, all other testaments must also be dated in order to be valid,
not because of any formal requirement peculiar to testaments,
but because of general law requiring that all notarial acts be
dated. 58 Louisiana has enacted no similar legislation. It may
be argued that the redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code, like
the French redactors, intended that all forms of testaments be
dated; however, no such express legislation was adopted and
if the courts were to adopt such a rule now they would only
be expressing a policy, not interpreting legislation. Various
arguments have been explored that could be advanced to support such a rationale, but as one writer pointed out, "all this is
extraneous to the question presented for adjudication in the
,,54 He concluded that the statute required, by
Gordon case ....
its terms, a complete date. Admittedly, this is a question about
which reasonable men might differ, but the court's determination
that "substantially similar" does not require a complete date
seems correct.
As a matter of general policy, and as a practical aid in
determining questions of testamentary capacity and relative order
of execution, all testaments should be dated. But when the
statute contains no express provision requiring a date, and if
there are no questions of capacity or order of execution raised,
there is little reason for not holding a testament valid and thus
fulfilling the wishes of the testator. In cases where the date of
51. Id. art. 1590: "It suffices, for the validity of a testament, that it be
valid under any one of the forms prescribed by law, however defective It
may be in the form under which the testator may have Intended to make
it.,,
52. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1588 requires that the olographic will be "entirely
written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator" in order to be valid.
(Emphasis added.)
53. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 664 (6th ed. 1954) in

LAZARUS,

3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS § 664, at 127 (1969).
54. Professor Carlos E. Lazarus in The Work of the Louisiana AppelZate
Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Successions and Donations, 31 LA. L. REV.
223, 231 (1971). See also 10 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 664(3) (6th
ed. 1954), in LAZARUS, 3 CIvIL LAW TRANSLATIONS § 664(3), at 127 (1969): "Provisions regulating the form of one kind of testament must not be extended
to testaments of another kind."
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execution is an issue and it is not established by the instrument,
the date may be established by ordinary proof. Just as witnesses
may be called upon to prove that the testator signed the document claimed to be his will,55 they may also be called upon to
prove when he signed the instrument."
Perhaps the single most valid conclusion that can be drawn
from Succession of Gordon is that the statutory will has substantially altered the role played by form in the Louisiana law
of testate successions. Before the enactment of the Louisiana
Wills Statute, the Civil Code imposed a rigid standard of form
on all testaments. Any deviation from the prescribed forms
caused a will to be declared null.51 The courts' interpretation of
the statutory will has relegated form to what many writers consider to be its rightful place-a means to an end, not an end in
itself.58 Formal requirements imposed upon testaments should
be a vehicle which protects the testator and those inheriting
under him from imposition, fraud, and undue influence. When
none of these evils are present, form has served its function and
the testament should not be struck with nullity.59
Lemuel E. Hawsey, III
55. LA. CODE Civ. P.

art. 2887.

56. For statements concerning the functions of witnesses, compare
Succession of Wilson, 213 So.2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 253 La.
56, 216 So.2d 305 (1968) and Succession of Reeves, 224 So.2d 502 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ refused, 254 La. 812, 227 So.2d 146 (1969) with Succession of
Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So.2d 551 (1971).
57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1595: "The formalities to which testaments are
subject by the provisions of the present section, must be observed; otherwise
the testaments are null and void."
58. Oppenheim, The Testate Succession, 36 TUL. L. REv. 1

(1961); Note,

45 TUL L. REV. 205 (1971); Note, 32 TUL. L. REv. 521 (1958); Note, 15 LOYOLA
L. REv. 362 (1969). See also Comment, 28 TUL. L. REv. 288 (1954); Note, 20 La.
L. REv. 610 (1960).
59. 10 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgmAIS no 664(2) (6th ed. 1954) in
LAZARUS, 8 CIVIL LAw TRANSLATIONS § 664(2), at 127 (1969), enunciates the basic

principle that "provisions relative to the formalities of testaments must be
interpreted in

conformity with the particular purpose that the legislation

intended to achieve in regulating the form of each kind of testament." See
The Work 01 the LouisianaAppellate Courts for 1968-1969 Term-Successions
and Donations, 30 LA. L. REv. 197, 203 (1970), which suggests that in regard

to the Louisiana statutory will "the evident purpose for the formalities required is to prevent substitution of the document prepared by, or under the

direction of, the testator." Therefore, in light of these civilian principles,
so long as formalities have been complied with to the extent that such substitutions are prevented, the testament should be held valid because the
formal requirements have served their purpose.

